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Comments
CHARTER AIR TRAVEL: PAPER AIRPLANES
IN A DOGFIGHT
GERALD S. REAMEY
Air transportation has traditionally been considered the most
expensive form of travel. In that price context, the charter is an
anomaly, a stranger in a strange land. The charter is the highest
hope of the cost-conscious consumer, particularly for recreation
travel. Supplemental air carriers have built multi-million dollar
businesses exclusively from the charter trade, and millions of
passengers have flown by charter. But an anomaly is inherently
suspect and becomes proportionally more suspect as it infringes
upon the status quo. That suspect status has entangled every major
airline, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), supplemental carriers,
and consumer groups in a struggle more intense and deadly serious
than any casual observer could possibly conceive.
The CAB has provided an introduction to charter travel:
Now, where do we stand today? I think we must recognize that
we already have a large charter transport industry. The U.S.
supplemental air carriers alone carry more than 3 million pas-
sengers a year. Moreover, the volume of U.S. charter travel today
is three times that which it was only a decade ago.
There is no question about it: The demand is there; the avail-
ability of charter air travel constitutes a matter of national interest;
it is threatened by critical economic problems; and marketable and
viable low-cost concepts must be found for those desiring and need-
ing this form of transportation.1
Resolution of questions concerning the viability of the charter
concept lies in a full understanding of the different charter forms
available, the possible alternatives to these forms, the advantages
and disadvantages of each, and the best way to accomplish the
purported charter goal of economical recreation travel. This project
'Hearings on S.421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1975).
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has been undertaken by legal commentators,' government regula-
tors, and, most recently, Congress There has been neither resolu-
tion nor evolution in charters; the area remains a fluid industry with
heavy pressures from all sides. But the pressures reveal the motives,
and the motives may lead to a solution. A study must begin with
the definition of the basic charter forms, the shaped forms that
must somehow be made to fit the shaped spaces.
AFFINITY CHARTERS
The earliest form of charter operation was the "social" club. The
social club concept (or affinity charter) presupposes a prior com-
mon connection between the passengers on the flight for purposes
other than travel.4 The CAB engages in very limited regulation of
these charters because they are of narrow scope both in percentage
of the air market and in routes covered.' The infrequency of the
flights, pro rata charge for the aircraft, and non-profit aspects of
the affinity group satisfied the CAB, initially at least, and apparently
convinced the certificated airlines that, if these limitations were en-
forced, social clubs would not prove a serious detriment to the
individually ticketed, regularly scheduled air carriers.
The crux of the CAB's regulatory power is Section 401 (a) of
the Federal Aviation Act,' which requires a certificate of public
convenience and necessity prior to operation as an indirect or
direct air carrier. The affinity charter organization may utilize either
supplemental non-certificated airlines or certificated carriers as a
source of aircraft, but under either alternative the charter organiza-
tion is limited by CAB regulations applicable to membership, ad-
vertising and pro ration of costs. The nature of the organization
'See Kamp, The Near Future of Air Charter Regulation: The Case for More
Experimentation in Public Policy, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 389 (1975).
3 See Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
"Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 483 F.2d 1284, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
5The CAB could regulate these services if it desired under the provision of
Section 401 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958:
No air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is
in force a certificate issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier
to engage in such transportation.
49 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1970).
Id.
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sponsoring the flight, not the nature of the carrier per se, determines
the extent of CAB regulation.
Certain areas of activity have been observed by the CAB in
determining whether a charter operator is within the limitations
prescribed for his operation. These include affinity, prior associa-
tion of the passengers for the requisite period, pro ration of flight
expenses, and limitations on solicitation or advertising." The
activity most susceptible of creating increased CAB regulation is
affinity of the flight participants.! The CAB faces enforcement
difficulties because of the relative ease with which a group can
claim prior affinity where none actually existed. To expedite the
factual determination necessary to ascertain affinity, the CAB has
simply required membership in the group by the prospective pas-
senger for at least six months prior to the flight." The CAB, in
employing this method to discourage the forming of a group solely
for the purpose of evading airline fares on scheduled flights, has
rationalized that a group with six months acquaintance had the
trappings of a social club, and that substantial numbers of travelers,
if required to plan months in advance of a vacation, would be
dissuaded from affinity charter usage by inconvenience."° This
reasoning has been applied by the CAB to its travel group charters
and has been accepted by at least one court as a reasonable
limitation."
Similarly, pro rating the cost of an aircraft for social clubs has
limited the availability of affinity charters to large groups which
'See, e.g., Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973); CAB Order
No. 71-5-39 (May 10, 1971).
'See CAB Order No. 71-5-39 (May 10, 1971).
'In an enforcement proceeding against Educational Student Exchange Pro-
gram, Inc., the Board found:
Many persons referred to ICEP by its affiliates, including ESEP,
for participation on the above-mentioned flights had not been mem-
bers of such affiliates for a period of six months and, in many in-
stances, joined such affiliates, including ESEP, merely in conjunction
with the transportation offered.
CAB Order No. 71-5-39 (May 10, 1971).
Such a finding is not unusual in cases where affinity organizations are suspected
of being indirect carriers. Although not conclusive proof of wrongdoing, the failure
of the passenger to have been affiliated with the suspect organization for more
than six months has been cited as some indication of misuse of the affinity charter.
"The same reasoning was used by the CAB in defending its institution of
travel group charters. 37 Fed. Reg. 222, 224 (1972).
"Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 483 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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plan ahead since smaller groups would be unable to recognize any
savings through chartering an aircraft if the rental cost were divided
among the membership. Even the CAB-approved split charter con-
cept, the sharing of one airplane by two groups with the same
destination, does not totally dispel the inherent limitation of cost,"2
and the increased administrative burden on both groups hampers
its implementation.
Another facet of pro rata payment not conducive to expanding
charter travel has been the ever-present possibility of loss to the
passenger."1 The pro rata payment has meant that passengers have
no idea what their final bill for the flight will be. They make
reservations based on the knowledge of the minimum price if all of
the seats are filled. Cancellations usually result in forfeiture of
deposit money for the cancelling party and a proportionally higher
price for the remaining passengers. This CAB-required alternative
purposely dilutes the benefit of cost savings to produce less com-
petition for certificated carriers."
Nor has the CAB been lenient in its inspection of the pro rata
requirement. A fixed price paid before the flight has been considered
evidence that the cost of the flight was not pro rated."1 If a charter
organizer does not divide the charter price equally and in an
obvious manner, the adherence to pro rating has been questioned."6
Although a showing that a single fixed price was charged before the
flight is not proof that the flight does not conform to affinity char-
ter regulations, it is an indication of attempted evasion of CAB
regulation. This assumption is strengthened when the organizer
1 29 Fed. Reg. 6005 (1964).
"In discussing pro rata payment of its proposed travel group charters, the
CAB said:
The nonvacationing traveler does not appear to be a likely candidate
for a pro rata charter. Nor, in view of the conditions surrounding
the proposed travel group charter rules, does it appear that the main-
stream of the vacation travelers in the dense North American mar-
ket is apt to be diverted to such charters. In our judgment, these
charters will tend to attract primarily those price-conscious travelers
who might not utilize scheduled services in any event.
37 Fed. Reg. 222, 224 (1972).
14 Id.
1" Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973).
"See CAB Order No. 71-5-39 (May 10, 1971).
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made no refund of any amount paid by the passengers in excess
of the actual costs."
The final limitation of affinity charters is the absolute prohibi-
tion of advertising for passengers. 8 Likewise, solicitation for mem-
berships in the group or organization for the purpose of travel at
reduced rates has on some occasions been characterized as an
attempt to circumvent the certification proceedings. ' Flights made
available to the general public have historically been considered too
similar to regularly scheduled carriers to avoid regulation. Several
imaginative plans to avoid the solicitation limits, including the
circulation of flight lists to other clubs for the purpose of allowing
their memberships to take advantage of such flights, have been
struck down by the CAB as advertising for passengers.' In one
such case, United European American Club and International Club
of California, both operating under the less stringent affinity pro-
visions of air travel clubs, made memberships so easily available
through nominal dues and publication of flight offerings to mem-
bers and non-members that their rolls grew to approximately
50,000.1 The CAB can easily detect cases of obvious solicitation
by affinity organizers; it is the group operating just beyond the
regulations while providing cheap and frequent air service that
most concerns the CAB and threatens the certificated carriers. Not
unexpectedly, these clubs have the best prospects for success and
claim the largest shares of the travel market.
Although its detractors emphasize the necessity for replacing
affinity charters with more attractive alternatives,' the underlying
pressure for termination is inconsistent with the usage patterns
engendered by the existence of affinity charters. Affinity charters
account for eighty percent of all charter travel23 and provide a large
1 7
1Id.
18 14 C.F.R. S 207.40(b) (1973).
19 Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973).
2 CAB Order No. 71-2-33 (Feb. 5, 1971).
21 Id.
' The CAB has proposed elimination of the affinity charter, presumably be-
cause of its discriminatory nature. As will be discussed infra, this proposal met
with such opposition that it was withdrawn by the CAB. See Notice of Proposed
Rule Making EDR-237C (October 30, 1974) and CAB Special Regulation SPR-85,
at 9 (August 7, 1975).
" Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975).
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share of total revenue for supplemental carriers supplying charter
service.' In a recent fare comparison of pro rata charters, one-stop
inclusive tour charters, and round-trip tourist fares, the pro rata
charter was significantly cheaper than either of the others.'
It is obvious from the statistics of affinity charters that the
pressure for their termination is from the regularly scheduled
trunklines, and not from consumers. Moreover, it is apparent that
this oldest form of vacation charter, discriminatory though it may
4 World Airways reported breakdown of charter revenue by type of charter
is as follows:
CHARTER REVENUES BY TYPE OF CHARTER, WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.
Year to date Nov. 30, 1974
Charter type In thousands Percent of
total
Pro rata (affinity) .. .......... . $22,404 37.9
ITC ..... ............... 16,328 27.6
Single entity ... ............ 11,820 20.0
TGC ..... ............... . 5,105 8.6
Cargo .... .............. 1,517 2.6
Wet Lease .... ............. . 1,392 2.4
Study group ... ............ .499 .9
Total .. ........... . 59,065 100.0
Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Con., 1st Sess. 32 (1975).
25 The CAB recently released the following price comparison chart in support
of its one-stop inclusive tour proposal:
Pro Rata Estimated Round-Trip OTC
Market Charter Price OTC Price Tourist Fare Undercut
New York City-Miami/
Fort Lauderdale $70 $115 $188 $73
Boston-Miami/
Fort Lauderdale 81 126 210 84
Chicago-Miami/
Fort Lauderdale 77 122 202 80
Cleveland-Miami/
Fort Lauderdale 70 115 188 73
New York City/
Orlando/Tampa 63 108 176 68
Boston-Orlando/
Tampa 75 120 198 78
Chicago-Orlando/
Tampa 65 110 178 68
Cleveland-Orlando/
Tampa 60 105 168 63
New York City-
Acapulco 136 181 392 211
New York City-
Bermuda 46 91 190 99
CAB Special Regulation SPR-85, at 88 (August 7, 1975).
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be, is a viable alternative. More recently proposed charter forms,
touted as consumer-oriented, have failed to compete financially
with the maligned affinity charter.
ALR TRAVEL CLUBS
Air travel clubs and affinity charters are similarly regulated by
the CAB, but the air travel club (ATC) allows charter travel
without the prior affinity requirements of the social club. To be
eligible for air travel club status, dues or membership fees must be
paid in addition to the pro rata flight costs found in other charter
forms. Unlike regularly scheduled carriers, the air travel clubs'
flights are sporadic and non-profit, and only a certificate of safety
from the Federal Aviation Administration is required for opera-
tion."0 This escape from certificated carriage allows the air clubs to
provide low-cost transportation without the hindrance of working
only with prior affinity groups.
Although air travel clubs began as limited operations, their
activities grew to significant proportions, causing concern to trunk-
line carriers and, in turn, the CAB."' Without a prior affinity re-
quirement, the air travel club would be more available to the
general flying public, but the distinction between regularly sched-
uled, individually ticketed carriers and group travel in the air club
would be narrowed. When that distinction is diminished, the trunk-
line carriers feel threatened by the removal of one unattractive
condition to air club travel. In an indirect sense the increased
availability of air travel clubs, coupled with their growing ac-
ceptance by the vacationing public, influences the market structure
of certificated lines. When charter operators begin causing the reg-
ulated services to lose revenue, the CAB will likely either tighten
the restrictions on the charters or bring them under its direct
regulation.'
2032 Fed. Reg. 1031 (1967).
27 One such air travel club, Voyager 1000, had approximately 14,500 outstand-
ing memberships representing an estimated 43,000 individuals eligible for the
club's flights at the time the CAB's Bureau of Enforcement filed its complaint
against the club. Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1973).
2' In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation, Arnold J. Barer,
legal counsel for Airclub International, made the following observation:
The real reson they (the CAB) went after Voyager was because
Voyager and Air Club International are the two largest, two most
1976]
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One of the most significant CAB attacks on air travel clubs
occurred in Voyager 1000 v. C.A.B" Voyager 1000, a non-profit
organization, began operating as an air travel club in 1964. Its
growth was steady, and by 1968 the club's membership stood at a
fairly constant 2,400. The directors decided in 1968 that the club's
financial difficulties could best be resolved by increased member-
ship.' This goal was achieved by a vast drive to attract new mem-
bers to the club through magazine advertisements, brochures with
flight schedules, and special student discounts."' Additionally,
Voyager held open houses for members and non-members at which
memberships were solicited and dues were often reduced by as
much as fifty percent. Large organizations in Indiana, home of
Voyager, as well as individuals contacted through mailing lists were
solicited to join the club. The regular initiation fee of two hundred
dollars for a family and one hundred twenty-five dollars for an
individual membership was cut to ten dollars, and monthly dues
were set at six dollars.s'
Voyager expanded its privately-owned fleet of aircraft to include
a Boeing 720 jet, two Lockheed Electras, two DC-7's and two
Martin 404's. International as well as domestic flights were offered
with increased frequency and at very low cost. Massive solicitation
successful air clubs in the business. They are the ones that have the
largest membership and fly the aircraft.
It presents no effective threat to the Board's jurisdiction to take
a situation where they want to go after an outfit that flies one DC-3
or DC-7 on a very sporadic basis. Certainly maybe they advertise;
a lot of them do. We have four or five other clubs; several of them
have jets. They have approached those clubs indirectly. They have
gone to the FAA; they have given the FAA an advisory letter, and
as a result, Jet Set had their 123 certificate revoked. Sunfari has
its 123 certificate under revocation, and now they have issued it
pending the Air Club case.
They haven't had to bring the enforcement because they (the
CAB) are accomplishing the same result indirectly by in effect
enunciating what the carriage-the common carriage rule is, and
then going over to the FAA, which obviously in part is one of the
requirements of a part 123 certificate. It is that it be legal.
Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1975).
29 489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973).
301 d. at 794.
31 Id. at 795.
32 For a closer examination of the facts of Voyager 1000, see CAB Order No.
73-3-1 (March 1, 1973); 7 IND. L. REv. 737 (1974).
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and low dues, together with the extensive flight offerings and
frequency of flights, induced the CAB, in response to scheduled
carrier pressure, to find that Voyager 1000 was no longer acting
within the purview of the air charter limitations.' The CAB ruling,
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, " held that
Voyager was acting as a public carrier and was not entitled to
exemption from CAB regulation. In this particular case, Voyager's
solicitation, ease of membership, and direct competition with
certificated airlines produced the kind of market depletion that is
almost certain to lead to regulation. Although the decision has
been criticized,' its importance lies in the willingness of the CAB
to declare a travel club a common carrier under less than absolute
violations of charter sanctions.' Voyager's soliciting of new mem-
bers was arguably no more than informing the traveling public of
the availability of memberships." There is no indication that non-
members were allowed to participate in the club's trips. Nor did
the club's charges violate the intent of the pro ration rule, even
though the charges were not necessarily changed with each flight.
In short, the facts of the Voyager operation would hardly stand as
a prima facie case of charter violation.
In a subsequent case, Club International,8 the court used the
Voyager rationale to find the club was operating in essentially the
same way as Voyager 1000. The CAB reiterated its stand that the
solicitation of members, regardless of whether that solicitation is
a colorable issue, coupled with relatively liberal membership re-
quirements, will suffice to classify an air charter as an indirect
carrier." The CAB's action against Club International is typical of
3" CAB Order No. 73-3-1 (March 1, 1973).
34489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973).
"See 7 IND. L. RV. 737 (1974).
"It is fairly clear that the CAB is itself unsure of the boundaries of legality
for ATC's. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the Voyager decision that no pre-
sumption of innocence attaches to ATC's in the eyes of the CAB. For an insight
into the CAB difficulty with ATC enforcement proceedings, see note 101 inlra.
11The "advertisements" of Voyager 1000 were addressed to "Voyager Mem-
bers Only," but invited non-members to join. There was apparently no solicitation
for flights by non-members as such, but only for memberships. 489 F.2d at 795.
8 CAB Order No. 74-9-70 (September 19, 1974).
9 In its finding, the CAB said about Club International:
In sum, the Club International operation involved indiscriminate
solicitation of every member of the public with as little as $15 in
1976]
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its enforcement proceedings against ATC's. After finding the club
was acting as a common carrier, the CAB ordered cessation of all
income producing activities pending appeal,"0 an action which
virtually assured the demise of the club regardless of the final
determination of higher courts. "
The air travel club cases demonstrate a CAB effort to extinguish
all successful competition with certificated carriers. ' But if an air
his pocket ($25 for a family man) to enjoy the pleasures of Club
International travel at savings far exceeding the "membership"
charge. As the Board said in Voyager, "the very reason for . . .
(Club International's) existence is the provision of transportation";
"the basic reason for obtaining 'membership' is to take advantage
of its transportation service," and "members are solicited from the
public at large and join with ease (i.e., for a small fee and with
no screening) for the purpose of obtaining transportation at reduced
rates." (Order No. 73-3-1, at 10-11). CAB Order o. 74-9-70
(September 19, 1974).
"0 Describing the CAB's action against the air club of which he is vice pres-
ident, Edward J. McDevitt of Airclub International told the Senate Subcommittee
on Aviation:
The CAB opened hearings aimed at finding us a common carrier
in violation without a certificate in 1972. Further hearings led to a
Board decision in September of 1974 which branded us as outlaws
and gave us 60 days in which to cease operations in violation of the
law.
During those 60 days we were forbidden to advertise or in any
way promote the advantages of the club. We could not accept any
new members, and in general were given a most emphatic shove
towards bankruptcy.
This tactic had already worked quite well for the Board in dis-
posing of several other clubs in other parts of the country, most
notably the "Voyager 1000" club base in Indianapolis.
New memberships which, incidentally, only cost $25 per year per
couple, were a major factor in meeting our ongoing expenses.
These immediately ceased.
Bookings for future flights dropped like a goose full of buckshot
because, naturally, the members felt quite nervous over the notoriety
and possible demise of the club. Refunds had to be made. Flights
had to be canceled because too few people were now committing to
go on them.
At the same time, creditors became extremely nervous, demand-
ed that all accounts be brought up to date immediately, and cash
in advance was demanded for such necessities as fuel, food, office
supplies, and all the myriad logistic details that go into the operation
and well-being of four large aircraft.
Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1975).
41 Id.
4 See note 101 infra. The current CAB proposals would indirectly eliminate
ATC's by combining them with other charter forms under one CAB-regulated
charter device.
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travel club does not provide competition of at least a limited nature,
it is not a viable means with which to provide the consumer an
inexpensive and responsive means of vacation air travel. Moreover,
the air travel clubs have worked under guidelines which provide
no clear definitions of their true limitations, in part because of the
CAB's reluctance to develop definitions." A hardship has been
worked on clubs like Voyager 1000 when they have expanded in
expectation of being allowed to continue, only to be struck down
by the CAB. This game of blind-man's-bluff is hardly conducive
to air travel clubs' survival.
If the CAB is successful in its attempt to effectively eliminate
air travel clubs, or at least their most attractive aspects as an al-
ternative to air carriage," the public will have only the choice of
social clubs or individually ticketed carriers. While the social clubs
undeniably have a great deal to offer their members, the member-
ship is discriminatory and the services available are relatively
limited. Air travel clubs, on the other hand, have often been able
to maintain their own landing facilities and terminals as well as
their own aircraft." These features enable the clubs to offer more
frequent and attractive flights at even lower rates because the
maintenance and flight operation expense is borne by the club rather
than a certificated or supplemental carrier. The social club is
typically a chartering service which must lease its aircraft, resulting
in higher costs to its passengers, and less frequent, sporadically
scheduled flights.
If the principal difference between social clubs and air travel
4See note 101 infra. In his appearance before the Senate Subcommittee on
Aviation, Harry R. Maugana, Jr., manager of the Atlanta Skylarks Air Travel
Club remarked:
As a medium-size air travel club in an industry which has previously
discouraged large growth, we face many problems. Uppermost of
these problems is the grey area in which we operate in regard to
government regulatory agencies.
Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 173 (1975).
"The CAB's attempt to eliminate air travel clubs is obvious in cases like
Voyager 1000, but the CAB proposed abolition of the affinity charters as well
in October of 1974. Notice of Proposed Rule Making EDR-237C (October 30,
1974).
"Voyager 1000, for example, maintained its own terminal at Weir Cook In-
ternational airport and owned a fleet of aircraft to serve its members. CAB Order
No. 73-3-1, at 5 (March 1, 1973).
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clubs is the prior affinity of their members, and the real operating
difference is that only air travel clubs can provide attractive services
competitive with certificated carriers, the apparent CAB dislike of
air travel club amounts to a preference for the industry it regulates
at the expense of the consumer. Some commentators have sug-
gested that ATC's must operate as a business, but do so in the
public interest.' The CAB has seized upon the "business" aspect of
ATC operation to attack the most successful clubs, ignoring the
manifest consumer desire for the service. Voyager 1000," Monarch
Travel Services, Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc." and Club
International, Inc." demonstrate a consistent effort by the CAB to
curtail sharply and perhaps destroy the air travel club. Each of
these cases involved a club of significant size competing with reg-
ularly scheduled carriers for travel trade." If the prospect of CAB
intervention is necessarily concomitant with success as an air travel
4"Arnold Barer, counsel for Airclub International, presented the ATC's view
of the business/public service nature of ATC's in recent testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee on Aviation:
I think in fact that air travel clubs have to be businesses. Obvi-
ously if they don't operate on business-on the terms of sound busi-
ness judgment, if there isn't risk capital provided for them, which
demand a return, they cannot exist.
The board has siezed (sic) upon the fact that it-virtually every
travel club, there has been somebody who has come along and who
has attempted to put the thing together and who has by the necessity
had to put up an investment and expects a return upon investment
and are a combination of business. They are a combination of busi-
ness and the fact that they are membership organizations.
Without the promotion, the membership organization cannot exist.
Without the membership organization, the business can't exist. And,
because of that, it is really unfortunate that the Board would like to
think of air travel clubs as businesses. They are just another guy
maneuvering in to get part of that industry; but that is a very simple
listing, very erroneous idea; and one that was effectively, I think,
rejected by the hearing examiner who came out to Seattle, sat in a
Federal hearing room and saw the literally hundreds of people who
appeared every day because it was their club that was involved. He
rejected that finding.
But the Board came back and put it in. They hadn't been there
to see the people.
Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 128 (1975).
47489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973).
4,466 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1972).
"I CAB Order No. 74-9-70 (September 19, 1974).
" See note 28 supra.
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club, very few clubs are likely to make any effort to establish them-
selves in a self-destructive market.
TRAVEL GROUP CHARTERS
In January of 1972 the CAB published a proposed rule5' estab-
lishing a new class of charter operation: the travel group charter.
This form of charter was implemented on an experimental basis
with permanent rules to be formulated consistent with suggestions
offered by interested parties and a review of the success of the
venture. In adopting this posture, the CAB believed that
the practice of limiting group charters to groups having a prior
affinity may discriminate against persons who are either not mem-
bers of any charter-worthy organizations or are members of or-
ganizations to (sic) small to mount an extensive and attractive
charter program, and embodies a concept very difficult, if not im-
possible to enforce."
The travel group charter (TGC), as initially proposed, was to
consist of a group of fifty or more persons with no prior affinity
forming a charter group at least six months in advance of the
flight." Each member of the group would be required to pay a
nonrefundable deposit equal to not less than twenty-five percent of
the transportation charges. " These deposits could only be returned
in the event that a replacement participant was obtained, and the
replacements could not total more than twenty percent of the initial
list submitted by the charter organizer. No mass media advertising
would be allowed and all charges would be prorated among the
participants.'
As might be expected, the consumer groups generally supported
the proposal with some qualms that the restrictions might prove
overly burdensome." The travel agency industry also supported the
51 37 Fed. Reg. 222 (1972).
52 id.
"37 Fed. Reg. 222, 224 (1972).
54 Id.
" For the conditions of the proposed travel group charter, see 37 Fed. Reg.
222, 223, n.1 (1972).
In its proposed TGC rule making, the CAB said:
Consumer groups voiced their support for the proposal on the basis
of need for low cost, charter travel. However, some concern was ex-
19761
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measure as did the supplemental carriers."' Not surprisingly, the
scheduled carriers and the unions representing their employees
strongly opposed the idea."' Weighty opposition notwithstanding,
the CAB urged the adoption of TGC's, stressing the inherent dis-
crimination against passengers under the affinity charters and the
enforcement problems with affinities and air travel clubs." The
necessity of maintaining a distinction between charter service and
individually ticketed service was met by the limitations, especially
proration of cost and the assumption of financial risk by the
participants."
In response to the specific charges of the certificated carriers
that the TGC would infringe on their market, the CAB enu-
merated several reasons why it believed that the carriers' ex-
pectations were premature or ill-founded.'" Those reasons included
the fact that the payment by the passenger six months in advance
of the flight would deter all but those making very long-range
pressed that the implementing regulations would prove overly re-
strictive and burdensome.
37 Fed. Reg. 222, 223 (1972).
5737 Fed. Reg. 222, 223 (1972).
58 Id.
The CAB said, in citing its reasons for establishing TGC's:
(I)t has always been recognized that it may be inherently discrimi-
natory to confine the benefits to persons who happen to belong to
groups formed for nontransportation purposes, while members of
the general public who do not belong to such groups are ineligible
for these benefits. Moreover, enforcement of the affinity charter
concept has proven to be very difficult, particularly in the area of
assuring that charter participants are in fact bona fide members of
a bona fide organization, and because of the ease with which travel
promoters have been able to form groups for ostensible nontranspor-
tation purposes but which are in fact subterfuges for the furnishing
of individually ticketed transportation.
37 Fed. Reg. 222, 223 (1972).
"The CAB itself has expressed uneasiness with the artificial requirement for
maintaining a distinction between charter and individual travel. In hearings on
Senate Bill 421, Acting CAB Chairman Richard J. O'Melia said:
The distinction between individual and group travel is an arbitrary
one from the point of view of the prospective passenger, and does
not serve any necessary regulatory purpose. So far as I am aware,
this distinction is unique to our own legal system. The legal require-
ment that the distinction must be maintained creates uncertainty as
to the extent of the Board's power to authorize charters, and the dis-
tinction is largely immaterial in terms of economic policy.
Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1975).
1 37 Fed. Reg. 222, 224 (1972).
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travel plans and would force the passenger to assume the risk that
his money would never be refunded in full, that the flight would
ultimately be canceled or that the price would be higher than
anticipated. That kind of financial arrangement, the CAB argued,
would preclude use of the TGC by nonvacationing passengers and
would be of little interest to the mainstream of vacation travelers."
Also, the CAB pointed out that the dire predictions made on
previous occasions by the regularly scheduled carriers had proven
inaccurate. 3 As a conclusion to the justifications offered by the
CAB, it is important to note that the CAB assured opponents of
TGC's that, if necessary, more stringent restrictions might be ap-
plied to curtail massive diversion of passengers to the charter ser-
vice." The CAB's forecast concerning the small impact of TGC's
on the certificated market was later proven correct.
The proposed addition of TGC's to the charter scheme caused
considerable agitation within the aviation industry. While TGC's
circumvented the most severe limitations of charter availability
(affinity and the stifling scrutiny of air travel clubs), the distinction
between charter service and regularly scheduled service has been
retained. Although the CAB may have believed its initial proposal
would be desirable to travelers, that supposition was proven in-
accurate soon after the adoption of TGC regulations on September
27, 1972."5 Reiterating the purpose of the TGC enunciated in the
prior proposed rule making, the CAB substantially ignored the
urging of the certificated carriers and eased the initial restrictions
on TGC's."
62 Id.
'In answering the charge of the certificated carriers that adoption of TGC's
would be catastrophic, the CAB said:
The Board wishes to emphasize that, in proposing these travel group
charter rules, it has no purpose or intention of impairing the viability
of scheduled services. In assessing the contentions of the route car-
riers that such will be its effect, we cannot ignore the fact that these
carriers have in the past made similar predictions in response to
proposals to expand the authorization of supplemental air carriers
or to liberalize the conditions under which they operate. Notwith-
standing these predictions, the traffic carried by route carriers in their




"37 Fed. Reg. 20808 (1972).
"Id.
1976]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The first adopted version of the travel group charter reduced
the minimum six-month lead time to three months; added a
minimum seven day stay requirement for North American charters
and ten days for all other charters; reduced the minimum group
size to forty; allowed the organization of TGC's in foreign coun-
tries; relaxed restrictions on refunds of the twenty-five percent
deposit; and, most surprisingly, allowed advertising of the charters
to the public at large."
The first year of operation under the adopted version of TGC's
proved disastrous. 8 The onerous administrative requirements and
travel restrictions resulted in only six hundred ninety-eight TGC
flights during the first twenty-one months of service. "9 This figure
represented less than seven percent of the TGC's filed with the
Board."0 The TGC as adopted failed for reasons that might be
explained by its experimental nature, filing requirements, higher
cost, or travel restrictions. The failure of TGC's, operating under
CAB-prescribed guidelines, forced further CAB experimentation.
Additional liberalization of TGC requirements was announced
by the CAB in 1974." The amended rules reduced the lead time
to two months and allowed up to fifteen percent of the passengers
to assign their seats to the general public if they were unable to fly."
These steps made the TGC considerably more attractive in a
number of important ways. The reduction of lead time permits the
traveler to avoid planning his trip seven or eight months in ad-
vance. Allowing assignment for travelers who wish to change their
minds relieves most of the concern that the prepaid fare will be lost.
These provisions, coupled with the elimination of advertising re-
strictions, insure the widest dissemination of charter plans and a
greater potential for their acceptance.
In its adoption of the rules, the CAB was careful to point out
that the plan was for an experimental period extending until
67 Id.
8 See Kamp, The Near Future of Air Charter Regulation: The Case for More
Experimentation in Public Policy, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 389, 398 (1975).
" Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975).
7o Id.
71 CAB Reg. SPR-78 (August 12, 1974).
72 Id.
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December 31, 1975."' This deadline was dropped by the CAB after
the adoption of TGC's, and the program was extended indefinitely,"
a step indicating the CAB's belief that the TGC as amended is a
workable alternative to other charter forms." This assumption
remains unsupported, and cannot be proven until the TGC is fully
developed. Development to that extent may only provide an op-
portunity to proclaim liberalized TGC's "unmarketable," a phrase
used by the CAB to describe the originally adopted version." The
experimentation recommended by one author" is, in fact, no more
than the course followed by the CAB in the past. Whether the
present experimental TGC form will prove more attractive to the
consumer is highly speculative, but continued experimentation
seems an ineffective and imprecise means of finding an adequate
low-cost charter form. There is no evidence that such an approach
has worked before, or that it is working now.
Shortly after the adoption of TGC's by the CAB, the certificated
carriers brought suit to test the validity of the concept. In Saturn
Airways, Inc. v. C.A.B.," the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
upheld the TGC's as a valid exercise of the CAB's administrative
authority. In so holding, the court found that the restrictions im-
posed by the CAB adequately limited the application of charter
service and precluded its untoward encroachment upon scheduled
routes."9 Because restrictions on TGC's have been eased since the
Saturn decision, that finding is now suspect concerning TGC com-
73 37 Fed. Reg. 20808 (1972).
7 4 Notice of Proposed Rule Making SPDR-40 (November 27, 1974).
75 Kamp, The Near Future of Air Charter Regulation: The Case for More Ex-
perimentation in Public Policy, 14 J. AIR L. & CoM. 389, 400 (1975).
76 CAB Reg. SPR-78 (August 12, 1974).
7
7Kamp, The Near Future of Air Charter Regulation: The Case for More Ex-
perimentation in Public Policy, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 389 (1975).
78 483 F.2d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
79The Saturn court held that the nature of the TGC was so different from
conventional charter forms that experimentation would be required to determine
its effectiveness and that the CAB might later change its approach:
(T)he Board remains free at all times to adjust its regulations in the
interim to adapt to unexpected results. The Board's experience with
charter definitions in the past and the comments and oral arguments
submitted to it led it to believe that this experimentation approach




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
petition with certificated lines. Nevertheless, no subsequent case
has been brought, probably because of the demonstrated financial
failure of TGC's.
The travel group charter could be a great improvement to the
previous air club-social club dichotomy. The introduction of the
TGC may extinguish the illegal air travel club and promote the
goals of low-cost air travel."0 Whether abuse of air charter provisions
will be curtailed by the TGC remains to be seen, but the CAB has
at the least provided a charter form of its own regulation. CAB
regulation of TGC's, if that charter form is now marketable, may
bring about a period of relative peace in the charter field; a time
when the effective organization of TGC's could produce a de
facto competitor to the certificated services.
ONE-STOP INCLUSIVE TOUR CHARTERS
In August of 1975 the CAB adopted yet another charter form.
The one-stop inclusive tour charter (OTC) was adopted to serve
the international market, replacing the foundering inclusive tour
charter.8 ' The basic concept combines air travel with a ground
package, often including hotel fares and meals. Restrictions similar
to those imposed on TGC's apply to OTC's, but contain provisions
for minimum stay requirements."'
Coupled with the OTC is a Special Event Charter (SEC) for
"specific and significant"' special events. The SEC, despite its
separate title, is little more than a domestic variation on the OTC."'
The OTC and SEC represent another CAB experiment in charters.
Much as the CAB-regulated TGC was adopted and strict enforce-
ment against ATC's promulgated, the OTC appeared at the same
time affinity charter abolition was proposed by the CAB.' Even as
the CAB admitted the success of charters, it continued to propose
0039 J. AIR L. & CoM. 463, 469 (1973).
01 See Kamp, The Near Future of Air Charter Regulation: The Case for More
Experimentation in Public Policy, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 389 (1975).
8 Id. at 402-03.
8' CAB Special Reg. SPR-85, at 13 (August 7, 1975).
84 Id.
8' Kamp, The Near Future of Air Charter Regulation: The Case for More
Experimentation in Public Policy, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 389, 402 (1975).
80 Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1975).
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new forms designed and regulated by the CAB. Whether the CAB
believed that experimentation could best be accomplished through
tight regulatory control or merely acted to protect the certificated
airlines is not entirely clear. Only the CAB's desire for complete
charter control is manifest from its actions.
This CAB domination has not resolved the ambiguities in char-
ter schemes. The TGC and OTC have been recently characterized
as "just too complicated" ' for practical use; and the CAB has
admitted the accuracy of this criticism. In hearings on the Low-Cost
Air Transportation Act, Acting CAB Chairman Richard J. O'Melia
said, "[tihe present regulatory situation affecting charters is quite
complicated to say the least. We have a proliferation of provisions
and technical requirements that are difficult to understand and
interpret."88 Changing proposals, CAB-intervention, termination,
and "experimentation" cannot be expected to remedy the situation.
The CAB has been unable to clear the muddied waters after years
of enforcement and pseudo-regulation; it is unlikely now to be
endowed with the insight or ability to remedy charter shortcom-
ings.8" If Senator Howard Cannon is correct in his assertion that "the
Board has considered itself completely above any policy inputs from
the Congress or the public,"" only a radical break with plodding
charter trial and error will produce improvement.
87 Id. at 46.
:8 Id. at 48.
' In his opening statement to the Subcommittee on Aviation, Chairman
Howard Cannon characterized the CAB's actions in charter regulations:
Time and again the Board (the CAB) has ruled against efforts
toward lowering air fares, against innovative discount proposals de-
signed to get more people to fly, against lower cost economy fares
for persons who desire fewer inflight amenities, and against carriers
who wish to offer wider seats or against carriers who wish to provide
lounges in their aircraft.
At the same time, the Board has followed a policy of unduly re-
stricting the charter air transport business without regard to the fact
that charter operations provide the only true low-cost air travel
alternative to the great majority of Americans.
Late last year the Board even went so far as to put out a notice
of rulemaking indicating that it was going to abolish the affinity
charter, the only type charter operation of any significance in the
United States today.
In short, the Board, in my opinion, has lost sight of its basic re-
sponsibility: That of promoting the public interest in air transpor-
tation.
Id. at 1.
00 Id. at 2.
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PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Presently pending before the Senate is a bill, introduced by
Senators Howard Cannon and Edward Kennedy, responding to the
seeming inability of the CAB to find an appropriate means of
concurrently satisfying consumers and airlines." The bill retains
the affinity charter which the CAB has attempted to abolish 2 un-
til such time as the Congress finds the demise of the affinity
charter concept necessary. Additionally, the bill provides for in-
clusive tour charters and changes the travel group charters to
"advance-booking charter" trips with even more liberalized reg-
ulations.' The purpose of the bill is to define more precisely the
charter forms and force CAB compliance with those standards.
The introduction of the advance-booking charter would take one
more step, perhaps the last step, in trying to provide a saleable
charter commodity. The proposed form would be a liberalized
version of the already twice-liberalized travel group charter. The
distinctions in travel limitations between the TGC and the advance-
booking charter are: (1) the advance-booking charter would re-
quire purchase of transportation by the charter passenger no more
than thirty days from the departure date; (2) the charter organizer
would be prohibited from selling up to twenty-five percent of the
seats on the advance-booking charter at any time prior to the de-
parture date, apparently to avoid the long lead time requirements;
(3) the charter organizer could not be prohibited from assuming
the commercial risk on any advance-booking charter and could be
required to offer seats at a pro-rated price; and (4) the advance-
booking charter would not have to exceed three days duration if
within the Western Hemisphere or seven days if outside the hemi-
sphere.'
Advance-booking charters would boost consumer participation
in low-cost flights with service similar to the certificated lines. The
1S. 421, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
9' The CAB withdrew its initial proposal to terminate affinity charters, but
future reassessment of that position can be expected unless congressional action
is taken.
'IS. 421, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1975).
41d. at 3.
I5 ld. at 2. Comparisons between the ABC and TGC as well as between the
ITC and OTC are represented by the following chart:
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legislation would provide clearer guidelines for the charter or-
ganizers and dispense with the witch hunt instituted by the CAB
against air travel clubs. The proposed Act requires the CAB to
define air travel club operation in "specific terms" within ninety
days after the effective date of the Act." This would permit the
valid air travel club charters to operate without fear of destruction
if they are able to maintain a sufficient portion of the market. It is
impossible to predict the effect of advance-booking charters on air
travel clubs, but it is possible that, in time, if successful, the
advance-booking charter would effectively displace the air travel
club. That displacement would be far preferable to the killing of
CAB-approved TGC S. 421 ABC
1. Advance filing period 60 days 30 days
2. Mandatory nonrefund- 25% of pro rata price None
able deposit
3. Fixed price No Yes
4. Mandatory cancella- Yes No
tion if certain load
factor is not achieved
5. Substitution or topoff 15% substitution 25% topoff
6. Tour operator assumes No Yes
risk
7. Minimum length of North America: 7d Western Hemisphere: 3d
stay Other markets: 10d All other: 7d
S. 421 OTC (ITC) Proposed OTC




















N. America: per seat price
of air transportation + $25
per day. Foreign: 110% of
lowest scheduled fare be-
tween same points
.25% of total passengers in
scheduled service between
same points in past 12m.
N. America: 7d; 3d when





Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975).
90S. 421, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. S 5 (1975).
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ATC's before a suitable replacement is in existence. In any event,
the demise of the air travel club as we now know it seems certain,
brought about either by continued strict CAB enforcement or
congressional initiation of an even more liberalized charter service.
This tardy congressional recognition of the need for a clear defini-
tion of service restrictions may give the advance-booking charter
a potent tool with which to avoid the fate of the air travel club.
CONCLUSION
The air traveler in America is presented with a deceptively
broad choice in low-cost air transportation. In actuality, the pas-
senger's selection may be so circumscribed as to provide no truly
attractive alternative to regularly scheduled, individually ticketed
carriage. As the charter situation stands, the CAB is promoting
untested versions of the TGC, OTC and SEC. The CAB has
attempted de jure termination of affinity charters and de facto
elimination of ATC's. The motive for this genre of CAB activity
is manifest upon scrutiny of its ramifications.
A pragmatic approach to appraisal of charter effectiveness be-
gins with the financial success of ATC's and affinity charters."' If
the affinity share of charter market approaches the eighty percent
figure claimed by its advocates," abolition of that form clearly flies
in the face of consumer demand. The unprecedented public support
for affinity charters engendered by the CAB termination threat
speaks eloquently in behalf of ATC's."
The lack of CAB attacks on affinity charters hints at acceptance
of the form. And if the form is attractive to consumers, only the
"'See note 24 supra.
's Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975).
1, Mimi Cutler, Director, Aviation Consumer Action Project, described the
hue and cry at affinity termination to the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation:
The public opposition to the abolition of affinities has been un-
precedented. Well over 20,000 letters poured into the Board, and the
dockets section received more than 4,000 sets of formal comments,
12 copies of each, from members of the public who opposed the
abolition of affinities. This strong evidence of nonsupport appears to
have had some effect. Two weeks ago the Board granted affinities
a stay of execution. However, it has not yet issued a final order and
could order the elimination of affinities with no satisfactory alter-
native to become effective at some time during 1976.
Id. at 64.
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supposition that it is too attractive remains. CAB discussion of
affinity discrimination and enforcement problems lacks conviction.
Assuming that affinities discriminate in acceptance of passengers,
there is no reason to suppose they were ever intended to satisfy the
entire charter market's needs. It is far more important to recognize
from their obvious public acceptance that affinities very adequately
serve a lion's share of the present charter market even with
discriminatory passenger intake. The CAB-proposed OTC, SEC,
and TGC discriminate in their services offered, a distinguishing
feature that lacks a difference. Obviously, no single charter form
is expected to cover all consumer needs, and argument that af-
finities are discriminatory is specious. Similarly, enforcement
difficulties do not militate against continuance of affinity charters.
The relative lack of enforcement proceedings against affinity charter
organizers is mute testimony to the ease of compliance with affinity
restrictions.
The CAB's strict enforcement against ATC's demonstrates a
motive consonant in its implications with the proposed affinity
charter termination. A review of CAB enforcement proceedings
against ATC's reveals one distinct common denominator. All ATC
violators have been sizable clubs making a significant impact on
the charter market. ATC organizers are well aware of the increased
likelihood of enforcement concomitant with growth.'* Only when
the ATC reaches a plateau enabling serious competition with
certificated carriers has enforcement been initiated. In part this may
reflect the regularly scheduled carriers' desire to restrict sharply
ATC activity because ATC's usually own their aircraft, effectively
denying any portion of their market to certificated carriers through
lease arrangements. CAB claims of enforcement problems with
ATC's' .' are well founded, but mostly of the CAB's own making.
100 See note 28 supra.
101 The following exchange between the CAB's Acting Chairman, Richard J.
O'Melia, and Senator Howard Cannon took place during Senate hearings on
S. 421:
Senator Cannon. Now, in refusing to adopt rules and regulations
regarding the operation of air travel clubs, the Doard (sic) has been
criticized by some for failing to spell out exactly what is permissible
carriage.
Some flying clubs complain that the Board's policy has made it
impossible to determine in advance what is permissible.
As you said in your supplemental statement that the adoption
1976]
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There is no question about the CAB's authority to promulgate such
regulations and guidelines as may be necessary to clarify the role
of ATC's, although no clarifications have been issued. This dilatory
refusal to fulfill its duties to the ATC's in any benevolent manner
leaves the conclusion that the CAB is inconspicuously trying to
murder the patient by substituting poison for medicine.
If the transition from affinity charters and ATC's to TGC's,
OTC's, and SEC's is completed, the results may well be more
regressive than beneficial. Affinity charter acceptance is a fact of
aviation life, as is the potential for wide-spread ATC utilization.
The dismal showing of TGC's, on the other hand, has required
continuous revamping by the CAB." ' The OTC and SEC are too
new for proper evaluation, but even assuming they fare well, they
are of little practical use. Considering the purpose of OTC's and
SEC's, the restrictive nature of these charters far surpasses any
discrimination attached to affinity charters. At their best OTC's
and SEC's serve a small portion of the vacationing public. Many
of regulations defining the boundaries between private carriage and
common carriage, so far as flying clubs are concerned, would be
little less than futile.
Why do you believe this to be the case and how can flying clubs
be expected to understand Board policy in this area unless you adopt
definitions and regulations?
Mr. O'Melia. Senator, this has been a problem perplexing me for a
long time. As former Director of the Bureau of Enforcement, it
bothered me.
I always thought that a flying club should be, for example, where
people in this room would all buy part of the airplane and we would
own an interest in it. We could then use it whenever we wanted to.
But when you get outside of owning an interest in that airplane
and are just a member of the general public being solicited by an
organization, whatever its name-travel club-for the purpose of
travel alone, then you are violating the present Board's regulations
on charters.
Now, if the act is amended as we suggest, any travel club,
whether it is a flying club, a social club, or whatever its name,
would be eligible to go on planeload charters.
Senator Cannon. You are really saying there would be no necessity
for the flying club if the act were so amended; is that correct?
Mr. O'Melia. That is my view, with the exception of ownership of
the aircraft. If the club owns its own aircraft and then is engaged
as a commercial operator, it would have to come in and get a 401
permit from the Board if it wants to solicit participants from the
general public.
Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1975).
102 See note 68 supra.
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consumers simply do not require ground packages, tours, hotel
rooms, or transportation; . nor are special events likely to serve the
needs of vacationing travelers. Only the TGC can fulfill those needs
under the CAB concept, and there is no indication that under even
the present form, TGC's will assume an important share of the
market.
The thrust of these CAB-regulated proposals is the tight control
of the charter industry by the CAB. There is no inherent evil in
such domination, but the trend to accept non-competitive charter
forms over tested concepts manifests the airlines' influence with the
CAB. No other conclusion is logically supportable. Affinity charters
and ATC's, the only proven and successful charters, have been
criticized and persecuted by the CAB. The most prominent bene-
ficiary of the CAB-backed proposals is the certificated airline in-
dustry. This is true for two reasons: the airlines gain passengers
any time charter travel participation declines; and the CAB's pro-
posals, unlike the ATC's, enable certificated carriers to share the
charter market with supplementals through lease agreements with
charter organizers. Assuming these considerations do constitute the
primary reason for the CAB's action, the motive need not destroy
the result if the public and industry are served by the changes.
Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that CAB-initiated
charters will offer consumers more. As shown, however, there are
numerous indications that the CAB proposals will have a very
detrimental impact on the consumer and the supplemental carriers.
The congressional alternative to continued CAB action is a more
sensitive and sensible approach. The ABC is the first truly liberal-
ized charter replacement for affinity charters and ATC's. Rather
than making minuscule and confusing changes in the ill-conceived
TGC, a one-step adoption of the ABC would prove or disprove
conclusively the efficacy of a liberalized charter. Certificated
carriers seemingly have nothing to fear from the ABC or any other
charter form; civilian domestic charters accounted for only 4.05
1"3 In regard to the consumer demand for OTC's, Edward Driscoll, President,
National Air Carrier Association, pointed out:
I might add here that OTC could never replace affinity since it
is coupled with a package and, as I mentioned previously, 53 percent
of those traveling affinity did not opt for the package.
Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975).
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percent of the total domestic revenue passenger miles flown by
certificated and supplemental air carriers in 1974."' Supplemental
air carriers, unlike the trunkline carriers, have received all of their
annual transport revenues from charter service since 1971." These
104 The CAB published the following information concerning domestic revenue
passenger-miles, showing the charter and scheduled service in each class:
DOMESTIC REVENUE PASSENGER-MILES




1. Over-all Domestic Charter
Revenue Passenger-Miles 5,224










CAB Special Regulation SPR-85, at 82
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(August 7, 1975).
" The following data were published by the CAB as an Appendix to Special
Regulation 85:
CHARTER REVENUES AS A PERCENT OF EACH GROUP'S
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figures reflect the minor portion of the industry captured by charter
travel under any charter form, and demonstrate the complete
reliance on charter service by supplementals. A considerable growth
in charter markets would not seriously undermine the certificated
routes,"' and would finally provide low-cost recreation air travel.
While providing for testing the ABC, the Senate proposal would
also maintain affinity charters until specifically eliminated by con-
gressional, not CAB, action. The bill would require CAB clari-
fication of ATC guidelines, a measure that would restore the poten-
tial of ATC's, even if the need is eventually eliminated by ABC's.
This solution is surely preferable to continued experimentation by
the CAB under pressure from certificated carriers. Positive action
to protect the consumer is needed; not a politically expedient and
practically useless compromise.
The "Low-Cost Air Transportation Act" includes the following
indictment of the CAB:
1971 8.0 4.7 1.8 14.7 100.0
1972 6.9 4.1 1.7 12.3 100.0
1973 6.3 3.4 1.5 10.2 100.0
1974 5.9 3.2 1.4 9.4 100.0
CAB Special Regulation SPR-85, at 81 (August 7, 1975).
101 In stating the case for the charters and explaining the ill-founded fears of
the certificated carriers, Edward Driscoll, President, National Air Carrier Associa-
tion, told the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation:
The irony of the situation is that in the air transportation indus-
try, as in most others, what is good for the consumer is also good
for the industry. As the committee pointed out in its report on
S. 1739, there is no evidence to support the myth that expanded
charter service will cause serious damage to scheduled service. On
the contrary, all of the available evidence indicates that charter
service actually stimulates the demand for all forms of air trans-
portation, including scheduled transportation.
There is just no justification for denying the consumer the kind
of transportation he wants and needs. If people are willing to put
up with the lesser convenience and flexibility of charter service in
order to benefit from the low fares that planeload economics make
possible, they are entitled to do so. The plight of the American
traveler of modest means, in the face of sharply increased fares
on scheduled service, is a very real one-and low-cost charter serv-
ices by both scheduled and supplemental airlines offer a practical
solution. In our view, government should be responsive to these
needs and desires of the public, rather than adhering rigidly to the
patterns of the past. Unfortunately, the actions of the CAB make
clear that it is unwilling to face up to today's realities, and to take
the kind of action which is required.
Hearings on S. 421 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975).
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The Civil Aeronautics Board has failed consistently to provide for
responsible regulation of such [charter] services consistent with the
need to encourage and develop such services."'
An agency may assuredly regulate and encourage services simul-
taneously. It may, however, be quite impossible for an agency to
regulate and encourage two services vying for the same market.
It is for Congress to decide what services should be made available
to the nation and delineate precisely the means for implementing
those services. Congress has delegated its regulatory authority to
the CAB, but it can never delegate its responsibility for the
regulation.
1 7 S. 421, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 2 (1975).
